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I. The Inadequacy of Abstract Definitions of National Security
Authors addressing the problem of how to assess properly human
rights when derogated in the face of national security claims often
point out the difficulty of determining what national security means.'
This ambiguity presents several problems for those who monitor
human rights.2 Wolfers has observed that when political formulas such
as "national interest" or "national security" gain popularity they need
to be scrutinized with particular care. They may not mean the same
thing to different people. They may not have any precise meaning at
all. Thus, while appearing to offer guidance and a basis for broad con-
sensus, such formulas may be permitting everyone to label whatever
policy he favors with an attractive and possibly deceptive name.3
Formerly, "national defense" meant military preparedness to protect
national territorial intergrity, independence, and sovereignty against
actual attacks from external aggressors. Such a state entailed actual
war waged by regular armies, usually in accordance with a set of rules
internationally accepted as the Law of War. The use of the army for
other purposes was "militarism." Such a clear-cut characterization can-
not be ascribed to the current concept of national security.
Today, the definition of national security depends upon the definer's
t Professor of Law, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
1. Today, the expression "national security" can refer to any of four ontological levels:
national security as a social sciences phenomenon, as part of strategy, as a governmental
policy, or as a fact. Similarly, the term encompasses four security objectives: national secur-
ity for the individual, for the regime, for the nation, or for the social system. It naturally
follows that the concept of national security would be elusive. The complex interaction of
threat-perceptions, security-goals, and security-means in the modern world has transformed
a broad assortment of values, principles, institutions, and forces into a kind of "mega-unit,"
where national and national security interests seemingly merge.
2. On the problem of the conceptual ambiguity of national security see supra note 1;
Smoke, National SecuriyAffairs, in 8 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 247 (F. Greenstein
& N. Polsby eds. 1975); Louw, Introduction to the National Security Concept, in NATIONAL
SECURITY: A MODERN APPROACH I (M. Louw ed. 1978) [hereinafter Louw, Introduction];
Louw, The Nature ofNational Security in the Modern Age, in NATIONAL SECURITY: A MOD-
ERN APPROACH 17 (M. Louw ed. 1978) [hereinafter Louw, Nature]; Matthews, National Se-
curity: Propaganda or Legitimate Concern?, in PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARISM
140 (A. Eide & M. Thee eds. 1980). See generally PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY MILITA-
RISM (A. Eide & M. Thee eds. 1980) [hereinafter EIDE & THEE].
3. See Wolfers, "National Security" as anAmbiguous Symbol, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 481 (1952).
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ideology. Consider for example, the gap between liberals, who view
the introduction of militaristic influences into the society as corrupting
society, and conservatives, in the manner of S.P. Huntington, for whom
the same influence means saving society.4 It is this same kind of inter-
pretative disparity that allows many scholars to view today's national
security doctrines as merely ideological rationalizations of a permanent
militarization of the state and society.5 For others, they are no more
than a mandate for state and class domination.6 It is precisely this ide-
ological bias that makes it sometimes difficult to distinguish between
"securing the nation" and "militarizing the nation."
Therefore, if one insists on finding an abstract definition of national
security, he must realize that it is not a purely military notion. It is
more a political category than a military one, a part of state policy in
which the military component is but one element engaged in national
security functions. Given that understanding of national security, one
might attempt to define national security as "[tlhat part of government
policy that has the objective of creating national and international con-
ditions that are favorable to the protection or extension of vital na-
tional values against existing or potential adversaries."' 7 However, this
definition is of little help in realizing what national security means in
practice.
Rather than being simply a subject of strategic studies, the current
concept of national security implies a new vision of strategy itself. Tra-
4. See S. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (1957) [hereinafter S. HUNTINGTON, SOLDIER]; S. HUNTING-
TON, THE COMMON DEFENSE (1961) [hereinafter S. HUNTINGTON, DEFENSE].
5. See, e.g., Thee, Militarism and Mitliar/sation in Contemporary International Relations,
in EIDE & THEE, supra note 2, at 15. Thee's paper and several others included in this book
were presented at the Pugwash Symposium on Militarism and National Security, held in
Oslo in November, 1977.
6. See, e.g., Luckham, Militarism: Force, Class and International Conflict, in THE
WORLD MILITARY ORDER 232 (M. Kaldor & A. Eide eds. 1979).
7. See Barber, National Security Policy, in NATIONAL SECURITY: A MODERN AP-
PROACH 35 (M. Louw ed. 1978).
In a general sense, "security" is an individual or collective feeling of being free from
external dangers or threats, whether physical, psychological or psycho-sociological,
which could jeopardize the achievement and preservation of some objectives considered
essential, such as life, freedom, self-identity and well-being. This notion of security
implies freedom from uncertainty. Such a state of affairs has an ideal existence only.
This concept is considerably different from that of security as related to traditional mili-
tary strategy, which focuses on the prevention of attacks, sabotage or mutinies against
the armed forces. Indeed, the present notion of national security has an all embracing
tendency which places it as close to the unexistent ideal as it can be, thus forgetting that
"the search for perfect security . . . defeats its own ends."
Lindsay, Introduction to Thomas Hobbes' "Leviathan," quoted in Wolfers, supra note 3, at
497 n.13. On what has been called "the security and power dilemma" see R. GILPIN, WAR
AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 94 (1981).
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ditionally, strategic studies were "war-focused, history-oriented, and
descriptive." Today, they are prescriptive, concerned about the present
and the future, and focus on producing policy alternatives.8 The old
military strategy has been replaced by the concept of "Grand Strat-
egy," an area where the skills of the soldier and those of the politician
merge.9
By recognizing this new strategic vision of security, it is possible to
generate a general notion of national security. This notion should
specify the major national policy areas with which national security is
concerned as well as the reasons for such a concern and the means used
to achieve national security goals. Accordingly, the politics of national
security of any nation can be characterized as the integration of its mil-
itary, foreign, and domestic policies with the aim of coordinating its
political, economic, psycho-social, and military potentials to guarantee,
against actual or potential external or internal adversaries, the achieve-
ment and preservation of its essential national objectives. In short, it is
"Grand Strategy."
Despite the neatness of this characterization, the real meaning and
scope of the definition will depend not so much on wording as on the
kind of historical problems and geopolitical framework by which a
state defines its objectives and policy-goals, on the prevailing social
philosophy and strategic views, and on the nature of the threats to
those objectives. However, before elaborating on this theme, it would
be instructive to consider in more detail how national security may
constitute a danger to those very principles it claims to protect.' 0
II. National Security as Dangerous Symbol: The Myth that
Security is Essential for Development
Today, the real focus of national security is the sphere of domestic
politics and policies. Generally, a power elite posits a situation of "bel-
8. Louw, Introduction, supra note 2, at 2-6.
9. Kissinger has said that "strategy is the mode of survival of a society," quotedin Louw,
Introduction, supra note 2, at 2, a phrase that can be considered the philosophical resum6 of
the doctrines of national security practiced today by the South American military regimes.
The current broad scope of strategy is well exhibited in the classic works. See, e.g., A.
BEAUFRE, INTRODUCTION A LA STRATEGIE (1964); A. BEAUFRE, STRATEGIE DE L'ACTION
(1966). See also B. BRODIE, WAR AND POLITICS (1973); A. ATKINSON, SOCIAL ORDER AND
THE GENERAL THEORY OF STRATEGY (1981); E. MERCADO, SEGURIDAD POLITICA Y Es-
TRATEGIA (1974).
10. On the relationship between national security policy and other policies, see Louw,
Nature, supra note 2, at 29. As to the tensions developed as a result of the "security-democ-
racy dilemma," see Kronenberg, The Greening of the Brass: Emerging Civil-Military Rela-
tions, in NEW CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (J. Lovell & P. Kronenberg eds. 1974).
Vol. 9:10, 1982
A Typology of National Security Policies
ligerent peace" which blurs the distinctions between internal and exter-
nal affairs. This elite proclaims the essential relation of security to the
development of a sound economy, thus legitimizing the restrictions it
may place on constitutionally mandated rights and freedoms. The cur-
rent concept of national security, oriented to cope with the multiple
conflicts arising from the East-West and North-South confrontations,
and the destabilizing forces of underdevelopment and development, is
construed so as to demand a permanent national preparedness for war.
To a large extent, domestic policies become subservient to the needs of
the military and foreign policies. The old concept of "nation in arms"
as an exceptional defense policy to face an actual war is transformed
into one where social and political energies are constantly channeled
toward achieving a "state of security." Giving priority to military and
foreign policies necessarily postpones the satisfaction of peoples' pres-
ent needs and expectations."' The acceptance of such a policy ap-
proach is enhanced by stressing the interdependency of security and
development. The binomium "security-development" thus becomes a
universal and absolute principle in some Third World countries.
However, because of its seeming abstractness, that core concept of
national security does not answer the questions of "security of whom?"
and "development for whom?" Therefore, the kinds of problems that
the national security expert must tackle are difficult, if not insoluble.
For example, he must determine what threats exist; which values and
interests should be protected first; how many restrictions should the cit-
izen be expected to tolerate because of national security demands; and
how much should the people know about the reasons and measures of
the national security policies. All of these problems demand a deeper
and permanent involvement of the national security bureaucracy in the
domestic political process.' 2
One can find here multiple sources of tensions between the aims of
the national security establishment and the claims by individuals that
11. See generally, Luckham, supra note 6.
12. The internal side of national security has to deal with rather non-conventional
threats, different from actual warfare operations and linked, by its nature, to the ideological
charact.ristic of contemporary belligerent confficts. These non-conventional threats are
those jeopardizing internal order, domestic peace and governmental effectiveness. In other
words, national security personnel are concerned today with problems of law and order, and
private as well as public morality; economic, social, ethical, and ideological conflicts; the
effectiveness and efficiency of political institutions and processes; the soundness of the eco-
nomic system and its capacity to produce the surpluses needed for national security pur-
poses; the levels of legitimacy and consensus as to national political projects and respective
foreign and military policies; and the level of national integration and morale, Louw, Intro-
duction, supra note 2, at 14-15.
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their fundamental rights and freedom are being violated. The problem
is further complicated by the existence of a sort of "built-in" mecha-
nism that encourages elites to dispense with procedural safeguards.
The secrecy of the security decision-making process, the elitist nature
of the national security bureaucracy, 13 and finally, the usually unpopu-
lar nature and effects of the security measures, reinforce the tendency
of the apparatus to keep its work from the public. Moreover, the feel-
ing of being responsible for making difficult, urgent, and important de-
cisions under highly stressful conditions encourages the national
security expert to attribute to himself the role of savior of the people, in
spite of the people. These built-in "a-democratic" influences will affect
the national values and objectives, forcing the national security expert
to face a double moral dilemma. First, he must protect those values
that make national security a legitimate policy, and second, he cannot
allow the request for discretion and expediency of the national security
operations to go too far without harming those values. At this level of
the problem-solving procedure, it might be difficult to avoid not only
lying to protect national security interest but distinguishing that from
the misuse of the national security interest in order to lie.
Essentially, this represents a major change in the traditional pattern
of civil-military relationships. A "politics of power" predominates.
This can easily slide into a "bellicization" of the political process with a
concommitant outlawing of the political opposition. This phenomenon
may be one reason for the current militaristic dynamics of the world
political process. Furthermore, some authors believe that "the dynam-
ics of global militarisation and its manifestation in the various coun-
tries are the most serious obstacles to the realisation of an international
legal order based on sovereign equality of states and security for the
human being."' 14 In fact, there appears to exist a close positive correla-
tion between current national security doctrines and the recent trend of
growing militarization, militarism, and armament across the world.' 5
13. A. JORDAN & W. TAYLOR, AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY: POLICY AND PROCESS
44 (1981).
[R]ealist propositions can be advanced, maintaining that foreign and security policy is
so important that it deserves the control of the most educated and informed; that mass
opinion is often too slow to crystallize; that public discussion can provide other govern-
ments premature information concerning U.S. national security policy.
1d. The authors themselves seem not fully to support this viewpoint.
14. Eide, Militarisation with a Global Reach: A Challenge to Sovereignty, Security and the
International Legal Order, in EIDE & THEE, supra note 2, at 299.
15. See generally EIDE & THEE, supra note 2; THE WORLD MILITARY ORDER (M.
Kaldor & A. Eide eds. 1979); Tapia-Vald~s, Armement et Doctrine de la Securite Nationale.:
Le Cas de la Junte Militaire Chilienne, in J. TAPIA-VALDtS, IDEOLOGIE ET POLITIQUE
MILITAIRE EN AMERIQUE LATINE (1980); A. Varas, C. Portales & F. Aguero, The National
Vol. 9:10, 1982
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Essentially the notion of national defense has been subsumed into
the amorphous concept of national security. By virtue of this fact, it
becomes extremely difficult to distinguish between "bare militarism"
and a legitimate national security policy. 16 To facilitate this task, this
author proposes a taxonomy of national security types.
III. National Security Types
Despite its potentially adverse effects on world public order, national
security is an unavoidable category of both strategy and politics. No
nation-state is free to determine independently what its security needs
are and, therefore, how much of its resources it should divert for secur-
ity purposes. The practical importance of national security compels the
search for an approach that could make security goals compatible with
democratic values and human rights. From this standpoint, neither a
general definition of national security nor an abstract moral judgment
of it are meaningful.
17
To obtain a more realistic assessment of the legitimacy of national
security and human rights claims, a typology which can identify the
different ways national security has developed in different countries is
necessary. Such a typology also could provide alternative ways to pro-
tect and defend human rights in particular cases.
This paper purports to present a tentative typology. To accomplish
this, we use a "descriptive construct," built upon the more general char-
acteristics of discrete kinds of national security notions, as actually en-
forced in different countries. Empirical data on the basis of which we
elaborate are available from many scholarly publications and from
field research reports of private organizations monitoring national se-
curity bodies. The types are worked out around a set of variables
which, although not tested empirically, have proven to be helpful in
specifying the major characteristics of each type. The variables are:
A. Political setting. Starting from the notion of "polyarchy" as
presented by R. Dahl, 18 we pay attention to the level of pluralism, the
and International Dynamics of South American Armamentism (1979) (paper presented at
the Conference on Research on Militarism and Disarmament in the Third World, Institute
of Development Studies, Univ. of Sussex, England, April, 1979).
16. See Schratz, Militarism or the Military Virtues? The Changing Role of Military Force
in National Policy, in NEw CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (J. Lovell & P. Kronenberg eds.
1974).
17. In this connection, it is interesting to note that U.S. and Chilean military literature
do not offer significantly different definitions of national security.
18. See generally R. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971). Ac-
cording to Dahl's model of a democracy comprising a large number of people, some of the
requirements for a polyarchy are the following: (1) freedom to form and join organizations;
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openness of communication channels, the legitimacy of the political re-
gime, and the likelihood of enforcement of a "Rule of Law." These
sub-variables influence the type of national security policy enforced.
B. Perception of threats. We search for the origin, whether external,
internal, or both, of the perceived threats, the kinds of threats, the ac-
tual or fabricated character of the threats, and the types of response the
national security establishment makes.
C. Permanent national objectives defnition. We pay attention to
what extent "national," as opposed to individual or group interests,
comprise permanent national objectives, and to the level of interven-
tion of the national security establishment in the defining of these
objectives.
D. Rank of the national security policy. This is the role of national
security policy in relation to foreign and domestic policies, viewed pri-
marily at the socio-cultural and economic levels.
E. Degree of autonomy of the national security establishment. Here,
attention is paid to whether the national security establishment acts
within a legal framework of power, and to its independence from polit-
ical and administrative bodies. The likelihood of actual political and
judicial control of national security policies and operations is also
assessed.
F. Human rights claims. The kinds of human rights violations, the
potential for domestic and international protection of human rights,
and the enforcement of due process of law are here examined.
Building on the basis of the above mentioned variables, we elaborate
three types which we respectively call, for reasons which will become
evident, "outward oriented national security policy," "national securit-
ism," and "inward oriented national security policy."' 19
(2) freedom of expression; (3) right to vote; (4) eligibility for public office; (5) right of polit-
ical leaders to compete for support and for votes; (6) alternative sources of information;
(7) free and fair elections; and (8) institutions for making government policies depend on
votes and other expressions of preference. Id. at 3. The concept of hegemony used else-
where in this article is not Dahl's notion of hegemony, defined as a regime intolerant of
"public contestation," id. at 7-8, but is rather Antonio Gramsci's idea of hegemony as the
capacity to rule by consensus. See A. GRAMSci, PRISON NOTEBOOKS: SELECTIONS (1971).
19. We have partially borrowed, to construct our typological cadre, from the variants of
militarism presented by Marek Thee, supra note 4, at 21-23. Nevertheless, we contest Thee's
assumption that outward-oriented militarism is characteristic of great "first and second"
world powers, and that inward-oriented militarism is characteristic only of the military re-
gimes of the Third World.
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IV. Outward-Oriented National Security Policy
A. Political Setting
This type of national security policy can develop in the kind of polit-
ical regime Dal describes as a "polyarchy." Under particular condi-
tions, this type may also.emerge within a "near-polyarchy" regime.
20
The political regime is characterized by the existence of a rational-for-
mal legitimacy, subject to permanent and regular checking processes
through periodic elections and judicial review. The communication
and information channels are free and open, allowing for the exercise
of the freedoms of assembly, opinion, and press. These characteristics
provide the rational and moral ground for the freedom and legitimacy
of the political opposition, and for the alternation in power of compet-
ing political forces.2'
However, we should not forget that we are dealing with a strategic
outlook the most obvious effect of which is an increase of military par-
ticipation in the political processes, conflicts, and institutions. Current
doctrines of national security have legitimized the military's exercise of
influence in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, the polyarchi-
cal system seems to offer the greatest hope that national security inter-
ests and democratic values may be reconciled. Because of the
characteristics of polyarchy, national security policymakers are forced
to balance national security needs with pluralistic interests and expec-
tations. The very same set of political conditions which allow a polyar-
chy to exist and survive will in principle directly influence the
philosophy, content, and scope of national security measures.22
20. In Dahl's terms, a "near-polyarchy" is a "mid-area" type of regime lacking one or
more of the characteristics of a polyarchy, but still closer to that type than to the "hegem-
ony" type. R. DAHL, supra note 18, at 8, 9.
21. Most of the elements distinguishing this kind of regime conform to the notion of a
"Rechtsstaat," or Rule of Law, that is, supremacy of the constitution, legality of the origin
and powers of the political and administrative authorities, ministerial responsibility, control
of legality, division of powers, and due process of law.
22. According to Abraham F. Lowenthal, "the relation between the level of military
institutionalization and the institutionalization of civilian political procedures may be a key
determinant of the varying political roles army officers play." Lowenthal, 4rmies and Poli-
tics in Latin America, in ARMIES AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 5, 20 (A. Lowenthal ed.
1976). See also Welch, Two Strategies of Civilian Controk Some Concluding Observations, in
CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY 323 (C. Welch ed. 1976). Nevertheless, the warning
made by Ejub Kueuk should be kept in mind: only to a certain degree do the existence of
democratic political institutions prevent the appearance of the militaristic phenomena. In
the Chilean case,
militarisation was carried out just because of the existence of democratic institutions of
the political system, since they had become highly suitable instruments of bringing
about the socialist transformation of society and had thereby become a direct threat to
the vital interests of the wealthy classes and foreign capital.
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B. Perception of Threat
If the internal political arena allows the alternation of political ad-
versaries in the exercise of power, the national security policymaker
will naturally focus his attention not on the domestic political conflict,
but on the threats arising from external enemies, mainly other nation-
states. War hypotheses and security operations are developed accord-
ing to the perception of actual, imminent, or potential threats against
the national territorial integrity and sovereignty.23
The same kinds of values and political and economic reasons which
limit the use of military power to counter actual, or prevent imminent,
external aggression, will also function in internal security contexts.
Under normal political conditions, only those individuals responsible
for political crimes previously defined by law will be prosecuted. The
declaration of a state of emergency will have to be grounded in the
need to confront actual, concrete, and manifest disturbances of the do-
mestic peace and public order. Regular political institutions will enact
the appropriate measures which will be temporary and regulated. Be-
cause of the existence of checks-and-balances mechanisms, there will
be no room for "fancied emergency" situations.
Given the pluralistic and competitive nature of the political arena, it
makes no sense to label political adversaries as "internal enemies."
Those challenging the system and its rules by violent means will be
prosecuted as felons because of their actions, and not because of their
thoughts or political philosophy.2 4
The outward-oriented characteristics of the national security policy
allow the persistence of institutional and professional differences be-
tween military affairs and police affairs. The use of the armed forces to
meet domestic political problems is exceptional and must proceed
under the control of the regular civilian government.
C. Permanent National Objectives Definition
As long as an essential factor of the polyarchy is government by con-
E. Kucuk, The Socio-Class Determinants ofMilitarism, in EIDE & ThEE, supra note 2, at 166.
23. Border problems can be sources for the threats; other sources include the blockade of
fundamental foreign policy objectives, the peril of direct armed intervention by another na-
tion-state in domestic political affairs, an attack on an allied nation, etc. The threat is actual,
external, and usually military.
24. Legislative measures adopted to meet the growing problems of terrorist actions do
not represent a real exception to the common principles of criminal law. The use of modern
technology to gather information, and the extension of periods of preventive detention, au-
thorize no exception to the legal and moral propriety of the measures taken, nor suspend the
rules of due process of law with regard to the offenders.
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sensus, the use of coercive force will be an exception. The composition
of the polity forces the recognition of pluralism as an outstanding value
in itself, while at the same time only pluralistic procedures can
determine what values and interests are going to be considered truly
national. Those values will usually be part of a formal, written
constitution.
Pluralism, universalism, and therefore institutionalized political con-
flict become the major national objectives at the political level. Plural-
ity and conflict are accepted not only as normal, but defined as the
desirable state of affairs. 25 This social philosophy implies the rejection,
as a matter of principle, of any view, whether civilian or military,
which attempts to replace pluralism. In brief, the national security es-
tablishment has little involvement in the definition of permanent na-
tional objectives. The influence accorded it in the policymaking
process does not amount to the incorporation of national security itself
as a paramount national objective, nor does it admit of the change of
values and goals democratically defined and legally protected by the
civilian political society.
D. Rank of the National Security Policy
Defined as the integration and coordination of the foreign, military,
and domestic policies, the general conception of national security im-
plies, first, the upgrading of national security itself, and second, the
participation of the military in many spheres other than its traditional
role in national defense. Yet, the extent of such participation will de-
pend mainly on the form and content of the defined permanent na-
tional objectives, the nature of the threats against them, and the
respective policy field.
At the foreign policy level, depending on the power position and ge-
opolitcal perspective of the nation-state, the outward-oriented national
security type demonstrates the influence of the new strategic concep-
tions. The foreign policy is conducted according to national security
concerns, sometimes going so far as to "militarize" the foreign policy.2 6
In all other policy areas, the political setting will force the policymakers
to assign priority to domestic policies oriented to meet internal social
needs. At the economic and financial level, for instance, the greater
25. This of course assumes that the use of regular institutional channels allows the adop-
tion of political decisions which are considered the best for all, or at least the least bad for
all.
26. See, e.g., Tapia Valdes, El terrorismo de estado: La Doctrina de la Seguridad Na-
cional en el Cono Sur, NUEVA IMAGEN (Mexico), 1980, at 45 (editorial) (bibliography cited).
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influence of national security is seen mainly by lobbying efforts to get a
bigger piece of the budgetary pie. Nevertheless, the prevalence of a
Cold War mentality, or self-assigned international roles related to for-
eign policy objectives, can foster the perception of a war-like situation,
resulting in the subordination of the domestic policies to the expecta-
tions of the war.
E. Autonomy of the National Security Establishment
Paradoxically, in the "outward-oriented" type, the national security
establishment's increased involvement in the overall political process
can diminish its autonomy.
First, a complex system of legal and political regulations and con-
trols obliges national security institutions to act within a determined
legal framework, and be subjected to checks and balances by the legis-
lature, judiciary, and public opinion.27 A second form of controls arises
from the nature and scope of the duties of the national security estab-
lishment. National security policy demands a closer cooperation be-
tween civilian and military at different levels. More important, the
inner circle of national security advisers often contains a civilian ma-
jority. It can be said that the military general staff is no longer a deci-
sion-making body, but primarily an advisory one.28
As to meeting internal security crises, the national security establish-
ment is forced to follow legally regulated procedures and penal law
definitions of criminal behavior. In brief, the existence of many institu-
tional and extra-institutional mechanisms which preserve civilian
supremacy over the military not only inhibits the latter's political au-
tonomy, but subjects it to civilian control in matters of war and
security.
F. Human Rights Claims
Where the enemy is defined as an "external" one, national security
claims would be addressed to stop foreign individuals or groups en-
gaged in espionage, sabotage, or terrorism. If the threat, short of civil
strife, is an internal one, the constitutional mechanisms to keep the in-
ternal order and safeguard the governmental institutions would apply.
In other words, without violating the constitution, rules for emergency
situations grant extraordinary powers to suspend some of the funda-
27. Actually, the problem evolves around the scope and methods of intelligence activi-
ties. See, e.g, A. JORDAN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 13, at ch. 7.
28. Schratz, supra note 16, at 287.
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mental political rights. However, this partial derogation of rights
should not extend to the exercise of the writ of habeas corpus, the rules
of due process of law, or the normal functioning of the regular
branches of government. The principle that the government, is law-
abiding then remains intact, including the legality and propriety of the
security and intelligence activities.
So long as national security decisions and operations proceed ac-
cording to regular legal procedures, the legitimacy of the national se-
curity claims should be acknowledged by the courts. Under such a
situation, claims in favor of human rights would succeed only if there is
evidence of abuses of power by the political or police authorities. Indi-
viduals considered as a threat to national security have the opportunity
to bring their case before the courts, or even political bodies, to be pro-
tected from abuses of the powers granted to the executive or military
authorities. More important, arbitrary repression cannot work in a so-
ciety in which civil liberties have a long tradition or standing. In such a
society, excessive appeals to national security and collective security
may backfire.2 9 Finally, in some cases it will be possible to resort to
international tribunals, if domestic procedures do not provide relief.
V. National Securitism
A. Political Setting
The type we call national securitism develops within a political arena
definable as a polyarchy in which the acuteness and persistence of the
political conflict forces the government continually to resort to its emer-
gency powers. In these cases, most of the external characteristics of a
democratic regime appear to exist, particularly civilian control over the
military. However, a gap between the official political discourse and
the actual policies of the rulers creates a purely formal democracy.
Such a perception is particularly sharp among the significant groups
opposing the government. In general, the government's legitimacy to
rule is at stake. The political system faces a crisis of hegemony, under
which the whole of the government's socio-philosophical foundations
and the corresponding structures and institutions of political power is
contested.30 This sort of crisis carries with it a marked diminution of
29. See Olivier, PoliticalAspects ofNational Security, in NATIONAL SECURTY: A MOD-
ERN APPROACH at 80-81 (M. Louw ed. 1978).
30. For a more extended analysis of our view as to the existence of a crisis of legitimacy
and a crisis of hegemony, see Tapia-Valdes, La legitimidad dictatorial: Elemenos para el
analisis empirico de los problemas de legitimidad en sociedades pery/'ricas, REVISTA CHILE-
AMERICA at 80-81 (1982).
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the capacity of the socially dominant sectors to govern by consensus.
The rulers usually respond by extending the externally-oriented secur-
ity measures to the domestic political arena.31 A consequence of such a
response is the de facto restriction, despite the formal recognition of
constitutional, principles, of the rights and freedom of significant num-
bers of individuals and groups challenging the government. The gov-
ernment controls all of their activities considered to be dangerous for
national security. In short, the government's answer to the challenge of
its legitimacy is a quasi-delegitimation of the opposition.
This situation is still far from that of the "garrison state."' 32 Never-
theless, the state practicing national-securitism justly could be consid-
ered a "national security state" 33 or a modem type of "police state."'34
The setting is not a state of emergency to meet contingent and tempo-
rary threats to domestic public order, but rather a permanent policy of
exercising stricter socio-political control by granting to the national se-
curity establishment a degree of power formerly applicable only during
an exceptional state of emergency. This enlarged security structure
represents a "militaristic" view of the political conflict which requires
control of dissidence. Civilian, military, and police roles are blended in
order to "manipulate" national security as a pretense to justify the use
of the police and armed forces in backing a determined civilian polit-
ical project and status quo.
B. Threat Perception
National securitism arises when a perception of an occasional and
limited threat is replaced by one of continuous and global dimensions
of external and internal origin. 35 Where a Cold War atmosphere per-
vades foreign policy, the elite is preoccupied with the ostensible dan-
31. Extension of the security measures to the domestic arena usually is accomplished by
means of installing an enlarged national security establishment.
32. In spite of the rather ideological criticisms raised against the Lasswellian model of
the military state, increased scholarly attention has been given in the last ten years to his
"garrison state" hypothesis as an analytical frame of the generic and structural factors and
foreseeable trends of the neo-military regimes. See, e.g., Smoke, supra note 2, at 324. See
generally M. JANOWITZ, MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND COERCION IN THE DEVELOPING NA-
TIONS (1977); A. PERLMUTTER, THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN MODERN TIMES (1977); D.
YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL SECUR-
iTY STATE (1978). See also Luckham, supra note 6, at 251; Matthews, supra note 2, at 140;
Tapia-Vald~s, El terrorismo de estado, supra note 26.
33. See generally M. RASKIN, THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY (1979); Smoke,
supra note 2, at 325.
34. See B. CHAPMAN, POLICE STATE (1971); S. COHLER, LAW, ORDER AND POLITICS IN
WEST GERMANY (1978); D. WISE, THE AMERICAN POLICE STATE: THE GOVERNMENT
AGAINST THE PEOPLE (1976).
35. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy and ScientqFc Development
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gers of too much democracy and too little economic stability,36 political
and social domestic actions causing instability are added to the list of
threats to national security.37 The aggregate effect of these pressures
and demands upon the political system drives national security officials
to a state of hysteria in which non-rational thinking becomes prevalent.
The result is a distorted perception of facts as black or white,38 where
democracy is blamed for giving radical groups of mass movements the
chance to abuse it by blocking governmental procedures and the re-
gime. In other words, democratic practices become suspected of sub-
verting that "capacity to govern" that the dictatorships seemingly
have.3
9
Because of both the ideological nature of the international and do-
mestic conflicts and the "eroding" effects of the social changes upon
institutions and political stability in Western countries, the national se-
curity expert is concerned with modifying the group-formation process.
According to Dutton, group-formation in Western countries is "spon-
sored and sustained by international interests and by non-governmen-
tal multi-national bases of power."' 40  It follows ideological
commitments which cut across the traditional loyalities to the state,
constituted political parties, communities, and even the family. There-
fore, groups formed according to this pattern become destabilizing ef-
fects of the developmental process itself.41 In this view, as long as
development entails change and adjustment, "the developmental pro-
ofthe House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 436 (1972) (statement of Ronald
Walters), reprinted in Louw, Introduction, supra note 2, at 11.
36. This preoccupation also includes concerns about transnational corporations' interests
and internal insurgency.
37. The erosive effect of social change on national security and political stability is a
central theme of Huntington's work. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, SOLDIER, supra note 3, at 1.
The epitome of that view can be found in Barrett, The Developmental Process and Stability
Operations, in MILITARY REVIEW (1972), reprinted in THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOLITICS: THE
MILITARY IN LATIN AMERICA 153 (B. Loveman & T. Davis, Jr. eds. 1978).
38. See Osgood, Assumptions About National Security, in SOCIAL PROBLEMS: PERSIS-
TENT CHALLENGES 196 (E. McDonagh & J. Simpson eds. 1965). See also A. JORDAN & W.
TAYLOR, supra note 13, at 53-54 (probable effect of the so-called American "crusading
spirit" on national security policies).
39. See Barber, supra note 7, at 38. "[I]t is sometimes. . . very difficult for a representa-
tive, pluralistic government to formulate and develop relevant security policies, (autocratic
or totalitarian governments encounter less difficulty in this regard)." Id. According to the
opinion of another expert on national security affairs, the conventional organizations of the
democratic system are not conducive to maintenance of the "unified command, joint central
planning, decentralized executive and sustained vertical and horizontal coordinations"
needed for a total strategy. Dutton, The Military Aspects of National Security, in NATIONAL
SECURITY: A MODERN APPROACH 100, 110, 113 (M. Louw ed. 1978). His conclusion seems
to be that when the survival of the state is at stake, democracy must yield. Id.
40. Dutton, supra note 39, at 101.
41. See generally Barret, supra note 37, at 153.
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cess is unsettling, fraught with difficulties, and laden with potential vio-
lence."'42 Since government cannot stop development, it perceives its
only option as channeling development toward realizable goals, by
means of carefully trained internal security establishment.
43
Underlying this attitude is a fear of changes to the internal social
structure that can induce changes in the power structure. These
changes are perceived to result, on one hand, from excessive politiciza-
tion of the domestic confict, and on the other, from a connection be-
tween the external enemy and domestic groups fostering more or less
radical changes.44 Thus, the potential exists to present the political
conflict as sliding towards a "war-like" system, characterized by high
expectations of permanent violence and instability.45 A "national se-
curity culture" can develop from this collective perception.46 In more
than a few cases, the terrorist practices of small groups of radicalized
middle class segments or national or ethnic minorities have allowed
national security experts to explain that phenomenon as a result of the
indefensibility of the traditional democracy in the face of a new kind of
threat. An example of such characterization of events is the following:
In the pursuance of their aim the Soviets generally support destabilizing
forces in non-communist countries and societies .... Within this global
situation the current threats against the national security of Western states
on a local and regional level are perceived to derive more from disruptive
forces within the state than from conventional inter-state rivalry.
47
While the foreign power supporting the domestic destabilizing forces is
not necessarily the Soviet Union, the common denominator in states
manifesting national securitism is the link made between external
threat and "home-grown" movements that reject the internal status
quo.48 The confusion between external threat and radicalized home-
42. Id.
43. Id. See also Nacht, Internal Change and Regime Stabilty, in THIRD-WORLD CON-
FLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PART I (Adelphi Papers) (Int'l Inst. Strategic Stud.
1981).
44. The perceived connection between the external enemy and domestic entities could be
either conjectual or planned.
45. On the mechanisms and effects of a "war-system," something equated to what
French authors call "la strategie de la tension," see Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War
System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973).
46. On the notion of "national security culture" see Smoke, supra note 2, at 324-35.
47. Dutton, supra note 39, at 104. This way of reasoning is characteristic of the "geopo-
litical" approach to Third World policies, as different from the "regionalist" approach. See
Chubin, The United States and the Third World- Motives, Objectives, Policies, in THIRD-
WORLD CONFLICTS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PART II (Adelphi Papers) (Int'l Inst.
Strategic Stud. 1981).
48. Commenting on the scope of the expression "subversive and disruptive movements,"
Dutton includes, among others, "labour strike actions and protest marches, demonstrations,
riots, defiance of authority." Dutton, supra note 39, at 104. Such movements include a
Vol. 9:10, 1982
A Typology of National Security Policies
grown opposition has made most leftist political parties or movements
targets of national security operations.49 The traditional anti-liberal
and anti-socialist stance of the military has reinforced the respective
indoctrination process.
C. Definition of Permanent National Objectives
The permanent national objectives of states in which national
securitism develops are still formally defined in a constitutional con-
text. Values and goals are the same as those of a pluralistic society
having a civilian government. However, by creating a "war-system"
and "national security culture," new national security policies intro-
duce a de facto modification of the stated national objectives. Al-
though the national security establishment does not have the power
formally to change the national objectives, it can alter them by means
of upgrading national security itself to the level of essential national
objective. The official discourse justifies this change of priorities as
necessary to protect the prevailing social values and goals.
National securitism does not elicit a political doctrine of its own. Its
ideology does not differ from that of the hegemonic forces of the soci-
ety. Nevertheless, so long as some individuals and groups come under
suspicion and some kinds of social change are looked upon as disrup-
tive, a de facto reduction of political freedom takes place. In this sense,
national securitism can be seen as an ideological effort to control the
content, scope, and direction of social change. By invoking the princi-
ple that democracy must yield when the state's survival is at stake, the
national security expert can redefine national objectives as those which,
within the purview of his ideological background, are essential for the
survival of the system. This could very well result in less pluralism, less
social change, and less participation.
D. Ranks of National Securit Policies
In the national securitism type, the perception of a global threat aris-
ing from a mix of foreign and domestic enemies will elevate national
variety of groups which voice their non-conformity with official policies regarding environ-
mental protection, armaments, problems of war and peace, etc. In addition, national secur-
ity operations have been directed against the organization and activities of critical political
movements which voice their disagreement with the status quo and seek to change it by
institutional means.
49. Such groups include: trade-unions not co-opted by the establishment; student as-
sociations; churches; foreigners and political refugees; circles of intellectuals and scientists
and the institutions where they work, mainly universities; and sectors of mass-media
professionals.
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security policy in almost all other areas. "Si vispacem, para bellum" is
adopted as the leading principle for policymaking. The preparation for
confrontation, conflict, or war replaces the seeking of human welfare,
dignity, or peaceful social life as the goal of the social productive effort.
The persuasive effect of national securitism is evident in a strong ten-
dency to militarize foreign policy. The foreign policy will encourage
the use of military means, in the form of technical assistance, training,
arms supply, covert intelligence activities, or direct or indirect interven-
tion.50 The military-industrial complex will be fostered, while at the
same time, economic proficiency and superiority over the enemy are
incorporated into security needs.51 Science, education, the arts, and
even sports are arranged into a single picture having social-psychologi-
cal appeal in terms of the feeling of security.
This war-like situation is intended to provide a stimulus for eco-
nomic growth. Nevertheless, it is necessary to ask the people to accept
the diminution or postponement of their expectations. The war-eco-
nomic effort is carried out at the expense of the resources otherwise
available for domestic social welfare. An economy simply cannot sup-
port both goals.
Under national securitism, the overall process of policymaking asks
"how much security is enough?" The implementation of policies
reveals just how little social change can be tolerated by the democratic
polity.
E. Autonomy of the National Security Establishment
A need for secrecy, specialization, and elitism drives the national se-
curity establishment to seek more power, discretion, and centralization
for its policy-making and operational capacities. Military principles of
organization, control, and intelligence are extended to areas quite re-
mote from military affairs. In the background lies contempt for poli-
tics, politicians, and democratic procedures, all of which are considered
unsuitable for planning and executing national security policies. 52 The
net result is the granting of a significant degree of autonomy to the
national security establishment and its transformation into a political
50. See the well-known thesis of Snyder about the "gray areas" in G. SNYDER, DETER-
RENCE AND DEFENSE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY 225 (1961).
51. See generally Lombard, The Economic Aspects of National Security.- Some Policy
Considerations, in NATIONAL SECURITY: A MODERN APPROACH 84 (M. Louw ed. 1978); A.
JORDAN & W. TAYLOR,Supra note 13, at ch. 14. See also Tapia-Vald6s,Alternatieven binnen
de Ahankeli(kheid: Chili en Venezuela, in POLITIEKE STELSELS STABILITEIT EN VERANDER-
ING (H. Rosenthal ed. 1982).
52. See supra note 39.
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police, empowered to control unilaterally other bodies of the state and
the civil society. The pyramidal structure of the large national security
establishment is politically and administratively responsible only to the
highest reaches of the executive branch. Moreover, in addition to their
blanket powers, granted under flexible legal rules, the security bodies
develop human and technological capacities enabling them to practice
"black operations" and to exercise almost total control over any dissi-
dent opinions or behaviors that might threaten national security.
The degree of the national security establishment's autonomy can be
tested by studying the continuity of its structures, functions, and even
its personnel, in the face of changes in the components and policy-ori-
entation of the major branches of power.
Under national securitism, the national security establishment func-
tions to warn the current government about activities that, by virtue of
their potentially destabilizing effects, could be utilized by potential ex-
ternal aggressors. It becomes the moral and political censor of its own
society, vested with broad discretionary powers to decide who is a dissi-
dent or critic, and is able to manipulate public opinion in order to legit-
imize the persecutions.
53
Despite the polyarchical type of the political setting, the degree of
autonomy achieved by the national security establishment can be con-
trolled only when its more outrageous activities trigger the concern of
the representative political bodies, the judiciary, or public opinion. For
the rest of its activities, that autonomy is enough for it to feel that mi-
nor infractions against the constitutional order are allowed in the name
of national security.
F. Human Rights Claims
The current world-wide concern for human dignity and human
rights has brought about a twofold concern about national securitism.
First, there exists a moral issue linked to the propriety and legitimacy
of the security operations, which prevents vigilance functions, juxta-
posed with the values of an open and pluralistic society. Second, this
moral issue is perceived as a loophole in the security screen, allowing
the penetration of the system by individuals or groups whose actual
aim is to cause a system breakdown.5 4. This situation forces the na-
tional security establishment to use political and administrative meas-
ures against the communication and information-gathering capacities
53. See Barber, supra note 7, at 35. See also Smoke, supra note 2, at 329-30; Schratz,
supra note 16, at 284.
54. See Olivier, supra note 29, at 73.
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of domestic adversaries. Potentially, a whole range of human rights
violations could appear.55
As long as the national security establishment does not act under the
umbrella of a state of emergency or martial law, the ordinary courts'
normal jurisdiction remains. It is rather exceptional to find the crea-
tion of special tribunals, although that has happened in some countries
with regard to the custody of terrorists. Because of the executive in-
volvement in the implementation of national security policies and the
habitual lack of means of the legislative branch genuinely to control
the national security apparatus, the last resort for the protection of
human rights is an independent judiciary. If such an institution lacks
the power or fails to fulfill its normal duties, national securitism can
transform the polarchy into a democratic facade behind which the se-
curity of the state is obtained at the expense of the security of the per-
son and legitimate society.
Even if a distortion of a legitimate conception of national security,
national securitism is not an unregulated state of affairs. This fact and
the conviction that national security considerations do not suspend or
modify the human rights guaranteed by the laws of the nation,5 6 make
plausible and possible an effective judicial counter-balance of the na-
tional security establishment. The residual duty of defending the very
same values and ideals against incursions by that establishment can
arise from an alert public opinion.
VI. "Inward-Oriented" National Security Policy
A. Political Setting
An "inward-oriented" national security policy is closely linked to a
strong authoritarian regime which transforms current strategic philoso-
phies into a political-military doctrine. This is the so-called "garrison
state" or National Security Doctrine Regime (NASEDO).5 7 Examples
can be found in South America (Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and, to some
55. Violations would be related to illegal invasion of privacy, in the way of wire-tapping,
or vigilance, or burglary, entrapment, forgery, illegal seizure, defamation, false arrest, re-
straint of freedom of movement, passport denial, and so on. Cases in which the intelligence
services have been responsible, directly or indirectly, for assassinations, are not rare.
56. See, e.g., Emerson, National Security and Civil Liberties, infra this volume.
57. "NASEDO regimes" is a name often given to the current military regimes of South
America. See, e.g., Tapia-Vald~s, La suprbmatiepolitique des militaires et la doctrine de la
scuritM nationale, 1-2 REVUE DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE (1981) (Universit6 Libre de
Bruxelles). The description that follows is based on the characterization of that type of
regime made in Tapia-Valdes, El terrismo de estado, supra note 26. See also Falk, Militarlsa-
tion qnd Human Rights in the Third World, in EIDE & THEE, supra note 2.
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extent, Argentina), in Asia (South Korea, The Philippines, and perhaps
Indonesia), and even in Europe (the Colonels' Regime in Greece and
the military government of Turkey).58
Under the influence of national security tenets and within a Cold
War setting, a new kind of militarism, characterized by its institutional,
permanent, and ideological nature, has appeared. The military estab-
lishment, mobilized by a revolutionary elan, is alienated from the dom-
inant social groups. By manipulating facts and information, the
military creates a feeling among the population that an actual and pro-
tracted situation of internal war exists. This strategy facilitates the mo-
nopolization of all political activity by the military. The bellicization
of politics will be maintained so long as the regime lasts. On that
ground, a sort of de-legalization of the political process takes place
which results in the government or ruling group remaining in power
above the law, with the political opposition outlawed.
Current models describing and analyzing the so-called "authorita-
rian regimes" 59 are useless in analyzing the role that military values,
goals, attitudes, and organizations play in this kind of regime.60 While
many of the regime characteristics have borrowed surreptitiously from
Leninist theories on state, law and politics,6I the bulk of national secur-
ity doctrine follows the U.S. military doctrines of strategy, tactics, and
intelligence.
62
58. On the extension of the neo-authoritarian analytical model to South Korea, see THE
NEW AUTHORITARIANISM IN LATIN AMERICA 396 (D. Collier ed. 1979) [hereinafter Collier].
See also J. MIN, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN KOREA, 1945-1972: A STUDY OF POLITICAL
FUNCTIONALISM (1980); H. SUNJO, THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH KOREA (1974).
About the Philippine example, see generally MARCOS AND MARTIAL LAW IN THE PHILIP-
PINES (D. Rosenberg ed. 1979). About the Greek example, see Vegleris, Grece: La dictature
Grecque et sa conception de la defense nationale, in REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIQUE ET DE LA
SCIENCE POLITIQUE, (May-June 1970). As to the nature, policies and goals of the current
Turkish military regime, the information publicly available allows one to compare it ideo-
logically with the Pinochet regime in Chile.
59. We refer to the notions of "neo-Authoritarism," "Bureaucratic-Authoritarism,"
"Corporatism," and "Nation-Building." For a criticism of the applicability of the analytical
models of authoritarianism to the South American cases, see Tapia-Valdds, Seguridad Na-
cional e Inseguridad Laboral, in SINDICALISMO Y REGIMENES MILITARES EN ARGENTINA Y
CHILE (CEDLA 1982). See also the rather critical studies of the bureaucratic-authoritarian
model and the corporatist model respectively contained in Collier, supra note 49, and in
AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORPORATISM IN LATIN AMERICA (J. Malloy ed. 1977).
60. The analysis includes a regime's historical background, its political praxis, and mille-
narian nature.
61. The characteristics that were borrowed from Leninist theories include primarily the
notions of sovereign dictatorship, permanent state of emergency, and internal enemy. On
the juridical-political nature and characteristics of the NASEDO regimes, see Tapia-Vald6s,
El terrismo de estado, supra note 26, at ch. VI.
62. See Luckham, supra note 6; Tapia-Vald~s, El terrismo de estado, supra note 26; M.
WOLPIN, MILITARY INDOCTRINATION AND THE UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM (1973).
The Brazilian armed forces developed the most sophisticated version of national security
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
B. Threat Perception
In the inward-oriented model, the military seizure of the state gener-
ally follows a deep domestic political crisis that the government could
not control because of the acute politicization and polarization of the
people. Usually, the government has been polyarchycal or near-poly-
archycal, a fact which is often cited to demonstrate the impracticality of
the consensual government for crisis management.
63
NASEDO practitioners espouse the view that the reasons for such a
political crisis are related to the existence of an "internal enemy,"
whose goals, at the domestic and international levels, have a foreign
inspiration. This internal enemy does not present a military threat.
Rather, as a foreign-inspired enemy, he is an "alien," devoted to per-
verting the society politically and morally and to destroying the state.
The society in turn, weakened by the criticisms of the enemy and by the
openness and liberalism of its values, is viewed as ill-equipped to over-
come this hegemonic crisis. Thus, the immediate goal, the military-
political project, is to discipline the polity, so as to enable it to identify
and eliminate this internal enemy and to secure the survival of the
state.64
Counter-insurgency tactics are applied to control the political arena.
Political parties and political activities are prohibited and the former
ruling elites are deposed, and in many instances, assassinated. At the
beginning of the military regime, there may exist an appearance of a
quasi-civil strife situation. After a short period of military operations
involving ruthlessly repressive tactics, however, the military achieves
total political control of the country. Nevertheless, the garrison state
will continue to maintain the illusion that it is waging a dangerous war
within the country's borders.65 Communist insurgency, native insur-
gency, and even simple pro-democratization movements are equally la-
beled as internal threats to security, and equally delegitimized as
doctrine. Other South American armies followed the Brazilian mode with local adaptations.
McCann, The Brazilian Army and the Problem of Mission, 1939-1964, 12 J. LATIN AM. STUD.
107 (1980). See also Tapia-Vald~s, El terrismo de estado, supra note 26, at 105 and the
bibliography cited therein.
63. Considered as a form of "modem Praetorianism" as described by Perlmutter, "the
modem military challenges legitimacy [of the democratic authority] and offers a new type of
authority." A. PERLMUTTER, supra note 32, at 93 (emphasis in the original). In other words
"the praetorian condition is identified with the absence of electoral and political support
procedures necessary for the establishment of authority." .d.
64. Falk, supra note 57, at 208.
65. In this way, the internal enemy continues to play a dynamic and legitimizing role for
continuance of the garrison state.
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political adversaries.66
It is not easy to determine how actual or imagined are the threat and
the enemies that the regime has to face.67 Ultimately, the justification
of the society as a war system requires an ever present internal enemy,
so that such an enemy will be created should he not exist in practice.
Regardless of any lip service the NASEDO may pay to restoring a new
kind of protected, authoritarian, or non-naive democracy, ultimately
the real internal enemy is the democratic man.
C. Defnition of Permanent National Objectives
In inward-oriented national security states, the definition of perma-
nent national objectives becomes a matter of military affairs. By judi-
ciously combining the constitution with strategic objectives, the
garrison state elite is able to characterize its political agenda as a list of
goals, values, and interests to be achieved and preserved for the good of
the whole nation. This set of objectives is usually synthesized in the
binomium "development-security." Allocation of funds is skewed
heavily toward military expenses, which support the enlarged and bu-
reaucratic police-military national security establishment. This dem-
onstrates that the actual priority is accorded security, and that
development merely follows from it.
The usually official military discourse 68 suggests the following princi-
ples from which permanent national objectives of the NASEDO will
directly derive:
1. securing the unity and survival of the military institutions;
2. securing the autonomy of the military institution with regard to
any particular social sector or class or political body;
3. attributing to the elite an exclusive authentic national
representativeness;
4. millenarian and revolutionary approach declaring an end to a
period of turmoil and decadence and the beginning of a new era;
5. conception of a missionary role regarding the protection of the
66. That enemy is qualified as a "dirty" one, a fact which will directly determine the
attitudes of the ruling military elite with regard to human rights issues.
67. On the one hand, more than attacking actual enemies, the regime prevents, through
different terroristic tactics, the development and organization of any significant opposition.
The goal is to "nip in the bud" all kinds of dissidence, and to give to the society a structure
and an ideology so homogeneous that pluralism disappears as a socio-political problem. On
the other hand, the socio-economic policies and the anti-political tactics will tend to gradu-
ally broaden the range of the oppositionist forces.
68. See THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOLITICS: THE MILITARY IN LATIN AMERICA 173 (B.
Lovemann & T. Davies, Jr. eds. 1978) (military speech).
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state couples with the national security experts' definition of national
values and goals;
6. permanent supervisory role of the governmental process and
political arena;
7. adoption of economic policies which will secure the existence of
surpluses to support the security needs;
8. aggrandizement of the international personality and presence of
the nation state.
Under this type of national agenda the state takes a clear ideological
path, enabling the rulers first, to affirm their own identity, and second,
to identify the internal enemy as a function of the opposition against
the militarily defined national goals. In short, the military has created
a political climate where neither the good nor the bad are subject to
doubts and compromise.
The actual major goals are securing the survival of the state and
achieving political stability by controlling and orienting social change
in ways which ensure the permanence of the military's rule. In this
way, the new political-military doctrine rationalizes and legitimizes the
prolonged control of the country by the armed forces. 69
D. Rank of National Security Policies
Although national security remains the exclusive province of the mil-
itary, it obtains the assistance of civilian technocrats from industry and
finance to coordinate national security policy with foreign, economic,
social, and cultural policies. The civilians are given a mandate to mod-
ify previous economic policies7o so as to meet national security needs.
The military requires that surpluses be expended on security needs.
This focuses the economic sector to proceed according to methods
which allow quick accumulations of financial resources.7' Even if the
military allows the private sector to plan in areas in which the military
69. Whether in the capacity of Commanders-in-Chief, or as National Security Council,
the military retains control over permanent national objectives, their implementation, and
the determination of how, why, and when such objectives are in jeopardy. Perceiving itself
above social classes, parties, and groups of contingent interests, the military is distrustful of
actual or significant civilian participation in the definition of national objectives.
70. In most of the known cases, those former policies were tailored to the needs of late-
capitalist regimes in the process of industrial development and have pursued monetarist
models to face crisis situations, to introduce structural changes, and to develop the economy.
On the influence and functionality of the monetarist doctrines of the Chicago School and
other theses of the neo-conservative doctrines for the ruling military groups, see Tapia-
Vald6s, supra note 59.
71. The very same economic policies seem to favor capitalist sectors other than the in-
dustrial one, except when this sector has already a size and competitiveness transforming it
in the central dynamic sector. This fact can be a major explanation of the difference of
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is not competent, all of the national policies must be designed to coin-
cide with the national security policy.72 In other words, despite the
seemingly strong influence of some civilian sectors and of the profits
that some of them can realize from specific economic measures, ulti-
mately any field of policy is under the control of the military rulers.
The latter are free to change the rules of the game whenever national
security interests demand that other views and priorities prevail.
E. Autonomy of the National Security Establishment
The NASEDO regime engenders the alienation of the military or-
ganization from the ruling civilian classes. The military institution can
imprint its principles of organization and system of values on all social
processes and relationships.73 Moreover, military leaders are free to
select their advisors and supporters from the many private sectors will-
ing to accept their rule. This power effectively forestalls the capacity of
the civil society to organize mass movements. Ultimately, this results
in no group being in a position to actually influence the decision-mak-
ing processes against the will of the military rulers.
Within this context, the concept of the dual state74 is clearly applica-
ble. Together the military government and the large internal security
bureaucracy form a prerogative state, which can exercise, without effec-
tive counterbalancing by other bodies, unilateral political control over
actual or potential internal enemies. This prerogative state is beyond
and above the law.
In all other matters considered to be technical, a normative state ex-
ists. Bureaucrats and civilians perform their duties and exercise their
rights according to the established laws. Nevertheless, this normative
state remains subordinate to the needs of national security. When a
problem evolves into a political or social class conflict, the prerogative
state will take control of the situation.
75
economic policies pursued, on the one side, by the Brazilian military, and on the other, by
the Argentinean, Chilean, and Uruguayan regimes.
72. For example, education, culture, mass-media, and employment policies are usually
addressed to upgrade the levels of control and self-discipline, as well as to indoctrinate the
population in new values, attitudes, and behaviors.
73. On the "alienated" nature of this type of military regime, see Kucuk, supra note 22,
at 150-52.
74. See supra note 61. See also E. FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE: A CONTRIBUTION TO
THE THEORY OF DICTATORSHIP (1941); A. WOLFE, THE LIMITS OF LEGITIMACY, ch. 6
(1977).
75. See generally E. FRAENKEL, supra note 74.
The area of the courts' jurisdiction clearly illustrates the military government's autonomy
regarding the law and the powers of other bodies. Not only do courts usually perform a
legitimizing role with regard to the dictatorship, they also undergo a critical curtailment of
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F. Human Rights Claims
Under NASEDO regimes, "an internal security bureaucracy, which
includes a network of spies and informers to penetrate all parts of soci-
ety and often to reach overseas to control exile activity, emerges and
grows."'76 The intelligence apparatus, which, besides gathering and an-
alyzing information, has the capacity to make decisions and implement
them directly, operates upon two premises. First, the enemy is a
"dirty" one, meaning that no rules of due process of law, and not even
laws of war, need be applied to him; and second, that the moral issue
linked to the violation of human rights is merely a weapon used by
external and internal enemies to hinder national security policies.
These premises provide a justification for NASEDO elites criminaliz-
ing the whole political arena by outlawing political opposition and
prohibiting any meaningful political activities. The number of poten-
tial targets of national security policies amounts to literally masses of
the population.
Within the above described stage the usual offenses against human
rights are linked to the right of life, physical integrity, personal free-
dom, freedom of speech, etc. But aside from violations of these funda-
mental rights, one cannot fail to consider violations which affect
essential social rights whose absence can foster a genocidal situation.
This is manifested in the pauperizing impact of the socio-economic pol-
icies usually enforced by this kind of regime, which besides high rates
of unemployment and low salary levels, forbids any protest on the part
of the workers. Thus, the scope of the NASEDO offenses against fun-
damental rights might be better described as a situation in which, from
the point of view of the rulers, rights and freedoms do not exist. In
other words, the individual has no inherent rights: the state is the gra-
cious grantor of rights and freedoms.
Domestic court protection of human rights has been almost non-exis-
tent in this type of regime. Aside from sporadic instances where inter-
nal pressures have prevented particular blatant violations, NASEDO
regimes have carried on relatively unhampered. Ultimately, they have
been a painful illustration of the importance of international institu-
their jurisdiction. Any matter that can be related to national security is removed from the
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Special courts are created and new rules establishing
permanent war or state of emergency tribunals are promulgated. Suspension of habeas
corpus, ex post facto laws, and other similar measures secure the prerogatives and autonomy
of the garrison state.
76. Falk, supra note 57, at 214.
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tions and organizations as a final form and force of human rights
protection.
More than in any other case, the illegitimacy of national security
claims can be presumed under the NASEDO type. The inward ori-
ented national security policy can be characterized by its actual abroga-
tion of human rights, a fact that cannot be shunned by cloaking it with
a claim that it is merely a matter of domestic jurisdiction or internal
affairs.
VII. Legitimizing Conditions for National Security Claims
If a crisis of human rights exists where the new notions of national
security are applied, it is because national security has put democracy
itself in jeopardy. The task, therefore, is to make national security
compatible with democracy and its fundamental tenet, the rule of law.
Only a national security policy regulated by law can be legitimate.
Some authors have offered interesting suggestions regarding this
problem.77 By partially borrowing from those authors, we will present
here some ideas that might help thwart the threat national security
states pose to human rights. Our solutions are intended to prevent the
use of fancied emergencies for political purposes; to protect the normal
jurisdiction of the ordinary domestic tribunals on human rights
problems; and to include elected public officials in the formulation of
national security policy if actual external war occurs. In brief, the sug-
gestions aim to preserve the effectiveness of the rule of law.
In our view, a sound national security policy should abide by the
following principles:
1. Subjection of the national security policies and institutions to the
fundamental laws of the land. This includes strict legal regulation of
their organization, powers, and functions regarding internal security in
peacetime.
2. Requiring national security operations to accord with national
values and standards.
3. Personal liability for those in charge of national security institu-
tions and operations for the crimes or abuses committed in the per-
formance of their functions.
4. Except in case of martial law, elimination of any special jurisdic-
77. We refer mainly to the papers presented at the symposium of the Allard K. Lowen-
stein International Human Rights Law Project, Yale Law School, Apr. 1982, Emerson, supra
note 56, and Schreuer, Derogation of Human Rights in Situations of Public Emergency. The
Experience of The European Convention on Human Rights, infra this volume.
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tion or procedure, and full jurisdiction of the ordinary domestic courts
to adjudicate all cases of alleged threats against internal security.
5. Where a state of emergency is constitutionally declared:
(a) There must be an actual or imminent threat. The government
(controlling political body) must exhibit sufficient proof.
(b) The government must release exact information about the
measures taken.
(c) Any such measures must be temporary.
(d) Any derogation of rights must be proportional to the extent of
the threat.
(e) Certain "derogation-proof' rights must not be abridged.
(f) There must be automatic view of the derogations of rights.
Such review should necessarily extend to the merits of the measure in
each case.
6. Granting of a supervisory role to international institutions and
courts upon domestic measures which could violate human rights, in
the event the domestic courts fail to protect them.
As a matter of course, the proposed measures are applicable only
within a polyarchy or near-polyarchy type or political regime. It would
be naive to pretend that such measures could protect human rights
within a garrison state. Ultimately, however, it is only by restoring de-
mocracy that those violations will be stopped.
Failure to make democracy and national security compatible and to
put under control a strategy supposedly directed to protect democracy
can make democracy worthless to live with and to fight for.
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